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Abstract: 
Correctional administrators have traditionally had a number of disciplinary tools at their 
discretion to maintain institutional control. Following the virtual elimination parole and good time 
credits, the State of Ohio created a unique penal policy to strengthen prison authorities’ ability to 
respond to prison violations. This paper reviews the passage of the bad time statute and its 
eventual demise at the hands of the state's Supreme Court. The study illustrates how 
correctional discretion is often manipulated to serve perceived political and institutional needs 
and the consequences of altering that discretion. 
 
 
 
Perhaps the most familiar story to scholars in the field of American corrections is the 
tremendous change in sentencing systems and policies throughout the United States over the 
previous 25 years (see Reitz, 1998;  Petersilia, 1999; Clear, 1994; Tonry, 1999a, b; Walker, 
1993). In general, these changes have been described as a shift away from rehabilitation- 
oriented indeterminate sentencing systems to policies emphasizing determinate, mandatory, or 
structured sentencing. Furthermore, these changes are thought to be one aspect of a larger 
movement among criminal justice systems to create and implement more punitive and 
retributive strategies in dealing with problems of crime and deviance (Beckett, 1997; Clear, 
1994; Donziger, 1996; Irwin and Austin, 1994; Walker, 2001). The State of Ohio has generally 
followed this trend by creating lenmer sentences, dramatically increasing prison construction, 
and limiting discretionary avenues that had previously been used to reduce prison sentences 
(see Holcomb, 2000; “Sentencing Overhaul is Responsibly Tough”, 1994). The following article 
examines how the social context in which new legislation was passed resulted in a particularly 
unique penal statute. While the law was eventually ruled unconstitutional, the rise and fall of 
“bad time” in Ohio’s correctional system is a story of how social and political circumstances 
impact legislative action and the consequences of altering correctional discretion. 
This study is not an empirical review of the use of correctional discretion in Ohio or the 
effectiveness of the bad time statutes. Instead, the article follows a tradition of research that 
explores how criminal justice discretion is changed, the social context of such changes, and the 
consequences of altering correctional discretion. The article begins with a discussion of the 
types and functions of good time within correctional institutions and a description of Ohio’s good 
time policies prior to major legislative changes, particularly Senate Bill 2.1 Senate Bill 2 became 
effective in 1996 and represented a major overhaul of Ohio’s felony sentencing laws. Consistent 
with national changes in criminal justice policy, Senate Bill 2 emphasized punitive responses to 
crime such as increasing the time served for the majority of offenses, mandatory penalties, and 
hting judicial and correctional authority to reduce sentence length. Next, the Lucasville prison 
riot is discussed and its relationship to Ohio’s overhaul of its sentencing model and penal policy 
is examined. A description of the new sentencing laws is followed by an analysis of the bad time 
provisions of the new legislation and the Ohio Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of 
that policy. The paper concludes by analyzing the role of bad time as a form of correctional 
discretion to enforce discipline violations. It is argued that bad time is another example of how 
changes to correctional discretion create the need for “creative” solutions for perceived political 
and organizational problems.  
 
Good Time  
 
While the development and contemporary use of parole is well documented (e.g. Bottomley, 
1990; Walker, 1993), the issue of good time has generally not received the same attention as 
parole in the academic literature (for exceptions see Chayet, 1997; Jacobs, 1982; Parisi and 
Zillo, 1983). Generally, good time refers to those policies designed to reduce a prisoner’s 
sentence upon some assessment of their behavior while incarcerated. Good time decisions are 
distinct from parole in that parole is a form of discretionary reZease while good time credits are 
usually reductions in the length of an inmate’s incarceration or in the time the inmate must serve 
before becoming eligible for parole.2 Good time policies may exist in jurisdictions that also use 
indeterminate sentences (such as pre-Senate Bill 2 Ohio), creating an environment in which 
offenders may have their actual length of incarceration affected by discretionary parole release 
and good time decisions (Chayet, 1997; Jacobs, 1982).  
 
As examples of what Walker (1993) describes as “downstream” decisions in the criminal justice 
process, the discretionary release of inmates on parole and awarding of good time credits have 
the potential to greatly unpact the length of an inmate’s actual incarceration3 While proponents 
have historically touted good time’s potential for improving prisoner rehabilitation and 
productivity, as Jacobs (1982: at note 8) noted, “[w]hatever its origins, good time became 
popular in the United States because of its presumed disciplinary value” (see also Chayet, 
1997). Thus, similar to parole, good time has historically been used as a mechanism to maintain 
prison discipline and to control the size of the prison population (Walker, 1993; see also 
Bottomley, 1990; Chayet, 1997; Clear, Hewitt, and Reglio, 1978; Jacobs, 1982).  
 
Correctional administrators have traditionally used several different types of good time credits. 
“Statutory/administrative good time” is an “automatic” reduction in an inmate’s incarceration that 
can be taken away for misbehavior. Such a credit system is often found in jurisdictions with 
overcrowding problems and may be used to reduce time to parole eligibility or in jurisdictions 
with a determinate-type sentencing model where good time is used to control inmate behavior 
and overcrowding (e.g. Clear et al. 1978; Bales and Dees, 1992). “Earned credit” is granted for 
productive or successful participation in approved program and activities. Finally, “meritorious 
credit” is typically granted only for an exceptional act on the part of the inmate that protects a 
person or property from harm (Jacobs, 1982; Chayet, 1997):4  
 
Good time in Ohio  
Prior to major changes associated with Senate Bill 2, Ohio utilized several types of good time 
credits and allowed for considerable diminution of the actual time prisoners were incarcerated. 
Under then existing laws, inmates could potentially receive up to a combined total of a one-third 
reduction in either their determinate sentence length or to the minimum length necessary for 
parole eligibility from the various types of credits (O.R.C. 2967.19 and 2967.193 [1987]; O.R.C. 
2967.19, 2967.192, and 2967.193 [1994]). First, eligible inmates were “entitled to a deduction 
from his minimum or definite sentence of thirty per cent of the sentence, prorated for each 
month of the sentence during which he faithfully has observed the rules of institution” (O.R.C. 
2967.19 [a], 1994). This statutory reduction was distinct from the two days per month of “earned 
credit” that inmates were eligible to receive for “productively” participating in either academic or 
vocational education, prison industries, or alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation (O.R.C. 
2967.193 [A][ 13, 1994). In addition, inmates “earned” three days of credit for “each full month 
during which the prisoner remains at minimum security status” (2967.193 [A][2], 1994). Finally, 
the director of the director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction had the discretion 
to award up to one hundred and twenty days of credit for meritorious credit involved in the 
protection of persons or property while incarcerated (ORC 2967.193 [B]). As a result, Ohio 
correctional administrators had a variety of mechanisms to dramatically reduce the amount of 
time inmates had to serve before becoming parole eligible or in reducing the length of their 
determinate incarceration. Given the continuous problem of prison overcrowding (see Reichert, 
1983; Holcomb, 2000) these mechanisms were a useful, if not necessary, tool in maintaining 
some degree of control on the prison population.  
 
LUCASVILLE AND SENATE BILL 2 
Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 2, Ohio had an unusual mixture of both indeterminate and 
determinate sentencing laws for felony offenders. Depending on the type of offense and when 
the offense was committed, inmates could be held under either indeterminate or determinate 
sentences. With a few notable exceptions such as those serving a shock incarceration sentence 
or on electronically monitored release (Ohio Revised Code [O.R.C.] 2967.19[F], 1994) and 
those required to serve full sentences (e.g. 10 full years) prior to parole eligibility (ORC 
2967.193[E][2], 1994), nearly all inmates were eligible to receive good time credit that could 
result in considerable reductions in their length of incarceration.  
To understand why Ohio policy makers altered the ability of correctional officials to affect 
sentence length, it is important to know the context in which those decisions were made. 
Beginning in the early 1980% Ohio began passing a number of criminal justice reforms and 
statutes that reflected an increasingly “tough on crime” approach to crime and criminal 
offenders. As a result, prison construction increased and Ohio experienced a fourfold increase 
in the incarceration rate between the 1970s and 1996 (Holcomb, 2000). By the early 1990s, 
Ohio sentencing laws were a complex mixture of indeterminate and determinate statutes and 
the correctional system was continuously over capacity (see generally, Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction Annual Report [O.D.R.C.], especially years 1990-1994). These 
circumstances created a situation in which Ohio was ripe for major changes to its sentencing 
laws but lacked the spark often necessary to generate sufficient political and public support 
needed for such efforts to be successful.  
The event that appears to have been central to the passage of Senate Bill 2 began on Easter 
Sunday in 1993, when prisoners at Ohio’s highest security correctional institution, the Southern 
Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucasville, took control of a prison block and several hostages. The 
riot lasted eleven days and claimed the lives of one correctional officer and nine inmates 
(Wilkinson and Strickrath, 1997; Wilkinson, 1993). Eventually, forty-seven inmates were 
convicted for offenses committed during the riots and five received the death penalty for their 
actions (O.D.R.C., 1994). The extended duration of the riot and the considerable property and 
human loss resulted in extensive media coverage and publicity. These factors, combined with 
the psychological impact of the riot occurring at the state’s highest security facility, intensified 
legislative and departmental policy responses after the riot was contained (see Wilkinson, 
1994). Included in this response was an increase in staff and prison bed construction (O.D.R.C., 
1993). There were also criticisms of existing sentencing laws and the perceived leniency of 
parole and good time credit policies (Hannah Report, 1994).  
Less than a year after the Lucasville riot, there were several competing crime bills proposed in 
the Ohio legislature (Hannah Report, 1994). A common feature of these proposals was the 
emphasis on more punitive responses to crime and changes in judicial and correctional 
discretion that affect offender sentences (Hannah Report, 1994). Eventually, the Ohio Criminal 
Sentencing Commission was asked to make policy recommendations for new felony sentencing 
laws and to develop a plan that considered “public safety, proportionality, uniformity, fairness, 
certainty, judicial discretion, prison and jail crowding, cost-effectiveness, and simplicity” (Ohio 
Criminal Sentencing Commission [O.C.S.C.], 1996: 3). The Commission’s recommendations 
were largely incorporated into the final version of the new sentencing laws that were passed in 
1995. After several minor revisions, Senate Bill 2, Ohio’s new felony sentencing laws, became 
effective in July 1997 (O.C.S.C., 1996). While it is likely that there were other influential factors 
in the development of Senate Bill 2, the nature of the changes to the criminal law, the increased 
severity in sentence length, and changes to judicial and correctional discretion suggest that 
Lucasville was more than a spurious event in efforts to change Ohio’s criminal statutes.  
To reflect a “truth-in-sentencing” model, Senate Bill 2 incorporated determinate sentencing for 
all felony offenders except those sentenced to life sentences with parole eligibility (O.C.S.C., 
1996). According to Senate Bill 2, the overriding purpose of sentencing that should guide a 
judge’s decision concerning the specific sentence are ‘punishing the offender and protecting the 
public from future crimes by the offender” (O.R.C. 2929.1 1 [A]; emphasis added). With this goal 
in mind, lawmakers crafted legislation directed primarily at increasing the severity of 
punishments, particularly for violent and felony drug offenses, and curtailed the ability of criminal 
justice actors to use their discretion to reduce the severity of a given punishment. Specifically, 
the creation of mandatory sentencing provisions, the elimination of parole for nearly all 
offenders, and reductions in availability of good time were designed to add a degree of certainty 
and structure to sentences served by offenders (O.C.S.C., 1996).  
Senate Bill 2 greatly reduced the availability of good time credits by eliminating automatic or 
statutory credits as well as meritorious good time. Inmates under indeterminate life sentences 
are no longer eligible for earned credit reductions even after they become parole eligible 
(O.R.C. 2967.13). Those sentenced to prison with sentence enhancements are also generally 
not eligible for earned credit reduction (O.R.C. 2929.14) and inmates who are eligible can 
receive a maximum of one day of credit for each full month of productive participation in 
approved programs (O.R.C. 2967.193). This was a dramatic reduction compared to the previous 
policies that could result in a sentence reduction of up to one-third of their total sentence 
exclusively through the use of various good time options.  
 
BAD-TIME PROVISIONS 
A consequence of the combination of eliminating parole for most offenders and virtually 
eliminating the use of good time was that Ohio correctional administrators felt they were left with 
relatively weak mechanisms to maintain prison discipline. Given the recent prison riot, 
correctional officials and policy makers wanted sufficient tools to maintain institutional control. 
Politically, correctional administrators believed they needed a mechanism to influence inmate 
behavior without resorting to the historical (and perceived “liberal”) practice of reducing prison 
sentence in exchange for positive behavior.5  
The policy known as “bad time” (O.R.C. 2967.1 1 , 1996) passed within Senate Bill 2 gave 
correctional officials the authority to extend prison sentences for inmates found guilty of violating 
criminal statutes while incarcerated without referring the matter to a criminal court. Rather than 
rewarding inmates for good behavior by reducing their length of stay, correctional officials were 
granted the authority to investigate, prosecute, and sentence inmates to additional prison time 
for criminal behaviors committed while incarcerated. Specifically, bad time allowed the Oh0 
Parole Board the authority to “punish a violation committed by the prisoner by extending the 
prisoner’s stated prison term for a period of 15, 30, 60, or 90 days” (O.R.C. 2967.11Pl). A 
violation is defined as any criminal offense under Ohio or federal law regardless of whether the 
prisoner is criminally prosecuted for the offense (ORC 2967.11[A]). This policy did not preclude 
the Department from also referring the matter to local prosecutors or handling the offense by 
other disciplinary actions used by the institution (ORC 2967.11[G]). For rule violations that do 
not involve criminal violations, corrections1 administrators could continue to rely on traditional 
disciplinary actions such as denying privileges, requiring treatment or counseling services, 
changing the inmate’s classification status, moving the inmate to another institution, segregation 
or solitary confinement, and denying an inmate any earned credits for a given period of time 
(Ohio Administrative Code [O.A.C.] 5120-9-07[E] and [K], 1999). Prison officials were not 
required to seek bad time extensions and continued to have the discretion to use other 
disciplinary responses to criminal violations instead of referring the matter for criminal 
prosecution or seeking bad time extensions.  
Per statute (O.R.C. 2976.11[C]), each institution was required to establish a rule infraction board 
(R.I.B.). After a violation allegedly occurred, a designated investigating staff member was to 
submit a report to the R.I.B., which held a meeting to evaluate the evidence. The accused 
prisoner had the right to testify and be assisted by a member of the institutional staff to present 
a defense. The R.I.B. was required to submit a report to the warden or head of the institution 
with ten days of the hearing and if the RIB found “any evidence of a violation” (O.R.C. 2967.illCl) 
it was to recommend a specific sentence extension as part of its report.6  
The warden reviewed the R.I.B. report and determined whether there was clear and convincing 
evidence that the prisoner committed the violation. If the warden agreed that the prisoner 
committed the violation and recommends a sentence extension, the warden submitted a report 
to the parole board with his or her recommendation. The parole board was then required to 
review the warden’s report and determine whether the evidence existed by a clear and 
convincing standard that the prisoner committed the violation and if so what the sentence 
extension should be: 15,30, 60, or 90 days. Prisoners could have their original sentence 
extended up to an additional one-half of their original sentence length for all violations (O.R.C. 
2967.11 [C], [D], and [El). If the violation occurred within sixty days of the end of a prisoner’s 
stated prison term, the institution had the authority to hold the prisoner for an additional ten days 
to allow for an investigation of the incident (O.R.C. 2967.1 l[F]).  
 
BAD TIME CHALLENGED 
Given the dramatic changes initiated by the bad time policy and the consequences of those 
changes for prisoners, it was inevitable that the policy would be challenged in the courts. A 
number of appellate courts heard challenges to the bad time provision in 1997 and 1998 and 
most of those courts felt that the constitutionality of the provision at that time was not ready for 
review. State v. Spikes (1997), involved inmate Terrell Spikes who had been sentenced to a 
sixth-month prison term for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. Upon 
being sentenced, the trial court informed the defendant that bad time could be imposed by the 
Parole Board for criminal violations that were committed while in prison under Ohio Revised 
Code. On appeal, Spikes challenged the constitutionality of the provision on due process, 
double jeopardy, separation of powers, and equal protection grounds. An Ohio court of appeals 
rejected Spikes’ appeal on two grounds. First, the appeals court ruled that Spikes lacked 
standing to challenge the statute. Because Spikes had not yet been given a bad time sentence 
(he only had the potential to be subjected to the penalty), the court ruled that Spikes could not 
challenge the provision. Second, the appeals court ruled that the constitutional issues raised by 
Spikes were not “ripe for review.” The court noted that, “...it is...well established that 
constitutional questions are not ripe for review until the necessity for a decision arises on the 
record before the court” (4, see Christensen v. Bd. of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline [1991]). In effect, until an inmate had been charged, an incident investigated, and a 
hearing undertaken, the issue of constitutionality of the provision was not ready for 
consideration. Several challenges to the bad time provision were initiated by defendants in 
situations similar to Spikes. In State v. Davis (1997), State v. Reeves (1998), and State v. 
Kutnur (1999) the courts of appeal reaffirmed the Spikes decision, declaring that inmates who 
have not been subject to bad-time provisions lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the bad time provision.  
In 1999, three cases came before the Ohio Supreme Court that effectively challenged the bad 
time provision. Consolidated into State ex rel. Bray v. Russell (2000), these cases involved 
inmates who had been assessed a bad time penalty in prison. The first case involved Gary 
Bray, who was convicted of drug possession in 1997 and sentenced to 8 months in prison. 
Before his scheduled release date, Bray assaulted a prison guard and the Ohio Parole Board 
issued a 90-day bad time penalty that began after Bray’s original sentence expired, Bray filed a 
writ of habeas corpus to an Ohio court of appeals claiming violations of due process, equal 
protection, and separation of powers. The court of appeals rejected Bray’s constitutional 
challenges and Bray appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. The second case involved Samuel 
White, who was convicted of receiving stolen property in 1997 and sentenced to a 16-month 
prison term. While incarcerated, White committed an assault and was given a 30-day bad time 
penalty. He committed a second assault several months later and was assessed a 90-day bad 
time penalty. In February 1999, White filed a writ of habeas corpus with the court of appeals, 
which ruled that bad time was unconstitutional because it violated due process and separation 
of powers. The state of Ohio appealed the White ruling to the Ohio Supreme Court. The third 
case involved Richard Haddad, who committed an assault in prison and was assessed a 90-day 
bad time penalty. In February 1999, Haddad filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Ohio Supreme 
Court. In these cases, the Ohio Supreme Court was forced to address contradictory rulings from 
two separate courts of appeal and another appeal filed directly with the Supreme Court. The 
court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of bad time with regard to due process, equal 
protection, and separation of powers. What was different about these cases, however, was that 
the prisoners involved had actually been subject to bad time extensions and, according to the 
rationale in Spikes, their cases were “ripe for review.”  
On June 14, 2000, the “bad time” provision of the Ohio sentencing laws (O.R.C. 2967.1 1) was 
ruled unconstitutional in a 5-2 decision by the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Bray v. 
Russell (2000). While the majority opinion reaffirmed the authority of the executive branch (via 
the correctional department) to exercise prison discipline, the court considered bad time a clear 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine embedded in the Ohio Constitution. Justice Pfeifer 
noted that bad time enabled, the executive branch to prosecute an inmate for a crime, to 
determine whether a crime has been committed, and to impose a sentence for that crime. This 
is no less than the executive branch’s acting as judge, prosecutor, and jury. R.C. 2967.1 1 
intrudes well beyond the defined role of the executive branch as set forth in our Constitution 
(State ex rel.Bray v. Russell, 2000).  
Interestingly, by focusing on a separation of powers argument, the court did not need to address 
more technical questions involving due process and equal protection concerns with the statute.7 
In dissent, Justice Cook reflected on Wolff v. McDonnell (1974), which stated that “prison 
disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution” (Cook in dissent, State ex rel. 
Bray V. Russell, 2000). Justice Cook agreed with the state’s contention that because the 
sentencing judge is required to notify the defendant at sentencing that bad time extensions 
could be imposed for prison violations, that any extension of the stated prison term was merely 
part of the offender’s original sentence. In such a situation, the parole board would merely be 
implementing a judicially imposed sentence and not engaging in actions that are beyond the 
scope of its power. The majority was not persuaded by this argument and ruled that despite the 
state’s attempt to define bad time as part of the original sentence, granting correctional 
personnel the authority to investigate, try, and punish inmates for new criminal offenses 
extended beyond the executive branch’s power as conceived in the Ohio Constitution.8 The 
court ruling mandates that until new legislation is passed, institutions will be required to either 
refer violations to local prosecutors or use traditional institutional disciplinary mechanisms 
(“Prison ‘bad time’ was bad idea”, 2000). To date, the state has yet to pass new legislation 
addressing the issue of bad time and appears to be analyzing various options before submitting 
them as formal proposals.9  
 
DISCUSSION 
Previous research (e.g. Chayet, 1997; Clear et al., 1978; Goodstein and Hepburn, 1985; Griset, 
1994; Holcomb, 2000; Walker, 1993) has reported that jurisdictions have often used a number 
of administrative and procedural tools to circumvent substantive changes to their sentencing 
system and the problems such changes create. For example, Clear et al. (1978) found that 
when Indiana eliminated parole, correctional administrators increasingly relied on good time for 
maintaining discipline within institutions. Scholars have noted that in a determinate sentencing 
system, good time could become an increasingly important disciplinary tool due to the 
elimination of parole as a motivator for good conduct (Clear et al., 1978; Morris, 1974; Parisi 
and Zillo, 1983). However, Ohio’s simultaneous abolition of parole and dramatic reductions in 
available good time resulted in real changes to correctional administrators’ ability to affect the 
len@ of an inmate’s incarceration. Recognizing the consequences of this change, 
representatives of the corrections department worked with the Ohio Criminal Sentencing 
Commission (O.D.R.C., 1994) to ensure that they had the means to “maintain order in prisons,” 
which is specifically why bad time was created (O.C.S.C.. 1996 3).10 Thus, the necessity of a 
%ad time” provision appears to have been primarily due to the perceived consequences of 
Senate Bill 2’s dramatic reduction in correctional administrators’ discretion to affect prison 
sentences through parole and good time.  
 
Good Time, Bad Time, and the Use of Correctional Discretion 
The following discussion focuses on the apparent failure of policy makers to adequately 
consider either the potential effectiveness or necessity of a bad time policy. In their study on the 
impact of good time policies, Emshoff and Davidson (1987) noted the difficulty in measuring 
whether good time affects inmate behavior. As previously noted, states such as pre- Senate Bill 
2 Ohio typically used good time as a negative behavior reinforcement by removing “automatic” 
credits as a form of punishment rather than rewarding positive behavior (Jacobs, 1982; Chayet, 
1997). Emshoff and Davidson (1987) stated, “It is likely that a deterrent- punishment policy is 
not the most effective use of good time credit.” Learning theory and behavior modification 
research suggests that positive reinforcement is more effective than punishment in producing 
lasting positive behavior (Emshoff and Davidson, 1987:348) 
Without questioning the validity of deterrence in general, we would suggest that good time, bad 
time, and perhaps even parole are distinct from traditional institutional responses to rule 
infractions because of the latter’s immediate impact on a prisoner’s daily life.11 Clearly, the 
impact different disciplinary tools have on inmate behavior is subjective and will vary depending 
on the specific inmate and context. However, as Goodstein and Hepburn (1985) found, inmates 
appear to be most concerned about actions that will directly and immediately affect their daily 
life within the institution. While the actual length of incarceration does appear to affect the 
perceived fairness of a punishment and reduce stress among prisoners (Goodstein and 
Hepburn, 1985), the deterrent value of threatening an extension to a prisoner’s sentence that 
would not affect them until the distant future is less clear (Emshoff and Davidson, 1987; 
Goodstein and Hepburn, 1985).12 It is reasonable, therefore, to question the ability of bad time 
to have achieved its stated goal of decreasing criminal violations among prisoners.13 
It is impossible to accurately gauge the impact bad time had on the behavior of inmates in Ohio. 
Actual bad time extensions were imposed relatively infrequently. During the four years that the 
policy was in place, only 262 bad time extensions had been imposed in a penal system of over 
40,000 inmates (Johnson, 2000).14 This figure may reflect an infrequent occurrence of observed 
criminal violations within the state’s prison system or prison personnel’s reluctance to initiate 
bad time proceedings. Whether or not the policy was properly implemented and utilized would 
certainly affect any evaluation of its effectiveness. Even assuming that the policy was 
implemented and utilized appropriately, however, it is unclear whether the existence or 
application of the policy would have had the desired effect(s) that policy makers hoped. 
A second major issue is whether a policy such as bad time was even necessary. Scholars such 
as Morris (1974), Messinger and Johnson (1978), and Von Hirsch and Haurahan (1979) had 
generally considered (at times reluctantly) good time a necessary tool to maintain prison 
discipline. This was particularly the case when a jurisdiction limited or eliminated parole release. 
However, Jacobs’ (1982) criticism of using good time policies to control inmate behavior is 
equally relevant to the use of a policy such as bad time. Jacobs (1982) questioned the necessity 
and validity of good time as a disciplinary tool largely because segregation - a readily available 
disciplinary action - is a potentially more punitive and effective sanction than denying a 
reduction in sentence. This would also seem to apply to the considerable range of other non-
bad time sanctions that are at the disposal of Ohio correctional staff. Jacobs (1982) and others 
(e.g. Goodstein and Hepburn, 1985) maintain that sanctions that more immediately impact the 
daily life and routine of inmates are more effective. This also appears to be supported by the 
literature on coping that identifies the important impact that stability and routine in daily life can 
have on inmate experiences (e.g. Adams, 1992; Johnson, 2002).   
Supporters of bad time would likely argue that the seriousness of the violations eligible for bad 
time extensions demanded a more punitive response than available options offer. However, 
Ohio prison officials continued to have the authority to refer criminal violations to local 
prosecutors. This raises the obvious question of why bad time was needed when it only involved 
violations of criminal laws. This very concern was raised by Jacobs (1982) who asked, if they 
[prison administrators] suspect a crime has been committed, why should they not be required to 
have the accusation tested in court? The reply usually given is that such cases are hard to 
prosecute and often end in acquittal. This puts the matter quite nicely. Good time [read “bad 
time”] revocation is considered a legitimate punishment because it is a way, in effect, to impose 
a criminal sentence which otherwise could not be imposed’’ (emphasis added, 260). This seem 
to be central to bad time’s raison d ’itre - a policy designed to accomplish actions within the 
existing institutional framewsrk without having to involve outside agencies and the potential 
problems such activities may incur.  
Von Hirsch and Hanrahan (1979) recognized the possibility of correctional authorities extending 
sentences in a limited manner for prison violations. However, they also acknowledged that the 
sanction of additional imprisonment beyond that determined by the court would likely require a 
criminal prosecution and the greater procedural safeguards it provides (found in Jacobs, 1982: 
243). Moms (1974) similarly noted that more serious violations should be handled through 
criminal prosecution rather than relying on good time or parole decisions.15 The reason for these 
concerns is that despite efforts to ensure sufficient procedural protections, “prison discipline 
hearings are, in reality, a far cry from criminal trials. Prison personnel preside over disciplinary 
hearings and such persons are subject to the pressures of institutional security, staff morale, 
and bureaucratic expediency” (Jacobs, 1982: 238). This criticism seems to underlie the Ohlo 
Supreme Court’s ruling. Bad time allowed correctional authorities (as an agency within the 
executive branch) to engage in activities traditionally reserved for the judiciary and thus violated 
the separation of powers doctrine fundamental to Ohio’s constitutional government and the 
United States in general. Furthermore, these activities did not adhere to the same procedural 
safeguards required in criminal prosecutions.16 
 
LATENT FUNCTIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 
Correctional institutions generally seek to achieve a diverse and often conflicting set of goals 
including security, treatment, incapacitation, and organizational maintenance (Gottfredson and 
Gottfredson, 1988). Even though parole and good time policies have been used primarily to 
affect security and organizational maintenance, the existence and use of both polices are 
consistent with a variety of correctional goals. Politically, however, good time and parole were 
perceived to be a remnant of more liberal criminal justice practices by Ohio politicians (see 
Hannah report, 1994; “Full, but fair sentences”, 1997).17 Within the social context of a recent riot 
at their most secure prison, Ohio legislators were keen to implement policies that could give 
correctional authorities the discretion to maintain prison discipline. It was determined that giving 
prison officials the ability to extend sentences was the best political solution to meet institutional 
needs. Thus, in an oft-repeated story, criminal justice policy was altered in reaction to social and 
political circumstances.  
The preceding discussion, however, illustrated that Ohio correctional authorities already had at 
their disposal a variety of mechanisms to maintain prison discipline. Therefore, the bad time 
policy was not created to serve stated goals that were previously unobtainable.18 This raises 
questions about how such a policy was able to make it through the legislative process. Some 
insight into the question may be provided by Tonry (1990), who noted that the latent functions of 
criminal justice policies are often as equally important to the creation and maintenance of new 
policies as their stated goals, From this perspective, bad time can be seen as serving a variety 
of latent, or less public, functions for several criminal justice actors including legislators, 
correctional administrators, and correctional officers.  
By supporting bad time, legislators and correctional administrators demonstrated that they were 
responding to the perceived public support for more punitive criminal justice policies (see 
Beckett, 1997; Clear, 1994; Holcomb, 2000). The importance of appearing “tough on crime” for 
political survival during this time period is well documented (Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Bright, 
1998) and bad time is clearly consistent with those interests. For correctional administrators, 
bad time was also symbolically important because it communicated to correctional officers (who 
had a colleague killed in the Lucasville riot) that administrators were sensitive to their needs and 
well-being. With bad time, correctional officers would have significant and meaningful authority 
at their disposal to insure prison discipline. The period following the riots was marked by co&ion 
and uncertainty and bad time was symbolically powerful to an organization looking for a new 
sense of purpose and commitment (see Tonry, 1990). By increasing officer authority, 
administrators communicate an increased degree of responsibility, trust and respect to line staff. 
The sense of correctional officer professionalism was likely enhanced by the increasing 
discretion granted under bad time procedures (Tonry, 1990). Thus, as Tonry (1990) notes, the 
latent institutional, professional, and political functions of criminal justice policy may drive the 
creation and continuation of policies despite evidence of their need or effectiveness.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This article described a unique penal policy created in a jurisdiction that had essentially 
eliminated two of its primary responses to maladaptive behavior in its prisons: parole and good 
time. Messinger and Johnson (1978) argued that the elimination of prison discretion such as 
parole or good time would require the creation of a new mechanism, “[i]f we have prisons, 
presumably we must supply those responsible for managing them with some disciplinary tools’’ 
(found in Parisi and Zillo, 1983: 234). However, this article is sympathetic to Jacobs’ (1982) 
position and has argued that previous research and Ohio policy makers overlooked the fact that 
correctional officials typically already have a number of legitimate and practical disciplinary 
mechanisms at their disposal. The need for a new policy such as good time to deal with criminal 
violations within Ohio’s prisons appears to have been largely unnecessary because other, 
perhaps more effective, responses already existed. In the end, bad time seem to have been a 
flawed solution in search of a problem. 
The future of bad time or a related policy is unclear at this time. A review of news media 
accounts and the lack of significant political outcries over the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling 
indicate a general public support or at least acquiescence to eliminating the bad time policy. In 
addition, several editorials have supported the court’s interpretation of the constitutionality of the 
policy (e.g. “Prison ‘bad time’ was bad idea”, 2000). The fact that the policy was used relatively 
infrequently may also make it less of a legislative and political priority.   
This analysis revealed how the context in which legislation is formulated can influence the 
nature of changes to existing policy and the creation of new policy. The creation of bad time 
appears to be consistent with prior examples of policy makers and correctional administrators 
responding to changes in one form of correctional discretion by relying on other existing or new 
discretionary tools. Although it was eventually ruled unconstitutional, the fact that bad time was 
passed into law and implemented for several years suggests how strong the “law and order” 
agenda was in Ohio during the passage of Senate Bill 2. Many scholars have considered good 
time an important discretionary tool, especially in determinate sentencing jurisdictions such as 
Ohio. Similarly, the virtual elimination of good time and parole created the perception that prison 
order would be impossible to maintain without additional safeguards. This does not appear to be 
entirely justified. First, the very effectiveness of good time credits in influencing inmate behavior 
is questionable. Furthermore, a variety of established practices already existed to deal with 
criminal violations within prison without requiring a new disciplinary tool.  
As a description of the rise and fall of a particularly unique penal policy, this study has several 
limitations. This article merely provided an overview of the process in which legislative and 
policy decisions were made. The goal of the paper was not to describe the decision making 
process but to illuminate the context in which those decisions were made and the relationship 
between that context and the passage of bad time. The article also omitted detailed information 
on the use of the policy and the various factors that may have influenced the decision to seek a 
bad time extensions in specific cases. Although this could perhaps provide insight into the use 
of correctional discretion, such data were unavailable to the researchers and were not central to 
the present inquiry. Finally, the theoretical implications of a policy such as bad time on the 
nature and use of correctional discretion has not been fully explored Changing policy to formally 
grant correctional administrators the authority to punish inmates appears to be a shift in the 
perceived function of correctional discretion. While the end result may be essentially the same, 
giving prison officials the power to extend rather than reduce sentences is conceptually different 
and may reflect changing perceptions of the role and scope of correctional authority. This is 
certainly an issue that requires further elaboration and consideration.  
It is recommended that future research pay close attention to the relationship between good 
time and other institutional responses to criminal and prison rule violations and changes in the 
use of correctional discretion. In particular, comparing practices in jurisdictions with determinate 
and indeterminate sentencing models could further illustrate how discretionary tools can be 
manipulated to serve institutional and political needs. Although they frequently result in relatively 
minor sanctions, discretionary correctional decision-making clearly affects prisoner quality of life 
and has the potential to have a considerable impact on the actual length of their incarceration. 
Perhaps most importantly, researchers should continue to be observant of how social and 
political context influence changes in criminal justice policy and correctional discretion in 
particular.  
 
NOTES 
1. Though the new felony laws were passed as Amended Senate Bill 2, it is commonly 
referred to as sqly Senate Bill 2 among policy makers and academics within the state.  
2. * This is not to say that there is no relationship between good time and parole decisions, 
simply that the mechanisms and structures in place to make such decisions are typically 
made at different times and are procedurally different.  
3. Good time credit is presently referred to as “earned credit reductions” under Ohio laws. 
For the purposes of this article, the term “good time” will be used to describe various 
policies in which an inmate’s sentence is reduced by prison administrators independent 
of any parole release decisions or emergency release provisions.  
4. Chayet (1997) considers policies of “emergency credit” as a type cf good time credit as 
well. Emergency credits are typically only used during periods of severe overcrowding to 
release large numbers of eligible inmates who have only a short tm of incarceration 
remaining. In Ohio, emergency release provisions have historically been a distinct 
category of correctional discretion that is quite restricted and requires considerable effort 
to enact. Therefore, at least in Ohio, emergency release credits are perhaps not best 
thought of as good time in the traditional meaning of the word.  
5. As will be discussed later, this is a critical point. The view that negative reinforcements 
are effective tools for maintaining order and that additional disciplinary mechanisms 
were even necessary was essential for bad time to have been considered a legitimate 
option.  
6. If the R.I.B. found no evidence of a violation, the R.I.B. was to terminate the matter. 
Similarly, if my subsequent reviewers did not find sufficient evidence to proceed, the 
matter was terminated.  
7. It is unclear whether the due process protections associated with bad time proceedings 
are sufficient to meet the safeguards required by relevant United State Supreme Court 
rulings. It seems that the liberty interest involved in penalties for bad time violations and 
Ohio’s creation of an interest by establishing formal procedures would require more 
stringent than those outlined for the removal of good time credits (Wolff v. 
McDonneIl(l974)) or placement in solitary confinement (Sandin v. Conner (1995)). 
Rather, due process in the implementation of bad time would likely rise to the level of 
those protections outlined for parole revocation (Morrisey v Brewer (1972)) and 
probation revocation (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973)).  
8. Twenty years ago, Jacobs (1982) foresaw this very problem when considering the 
boundaries of correctional discretion in sanctioning prisoners though he did not 
specifically identify the issue as a separation of powers concern. 
9. As an interesting side note, an undergraduate student intern from our program indicated 
that the judges in the county where he is interning continue to advise defendants that 
bad time may be imposed despite the court’s ruling presumably because the policy may 
come back in some form. It is unclear why judges believe such instructions could be 
considered valid given the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling on the policy and potential ex 
post fact0 problems.  
10. A major state newspaper described the policy in the following way: “TO ensure that the 
1996 ‘truth-in-sentencing’ law didn’t prevent wardens from keeping inmates in line, 
officials were granted the right to extend sentences” (“Prison ‘bad time’ was bad idea”, 
2000). 
11. This is not the appropriate format tc discuss the deterrent impact of criminal sanctions. It 
should be noted, however, that a considerable body of research questions the deterrent 
value of a variety of criminal punishments (e.g. Lynch, 1999; Peterson and Bailey, 1998; 
Marvell and Moody, 2001).  
12. While the existing “earned credit” provision of Ohio’s remaining good time policy (ORC 
2967.193) represents a positive reinforcement model, bad time was clearly based on a 
punishment model of behavioral reinforcement.  
13. It could be argued that bad time was never really intended to be utilitarian in nature but a 
deserts-based form of punishment to be exacted by prison officials. This, however, 
would be contrary to the official justification that focused on maintaining prison discipline 
and without further evidence would simply be conjecture at this point.  
14. Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections records indicate that in 1999 there were 
153 bad time hearings. No assessment was made in 23 cases, 15 day extensions were 
imposed in 6 cases, 30 day extensions in 7 cases, 60 day extensions in 44 cases, and 
90 day extensions were imposed in 73 cases (Steve Van Dine, Director of Research, 
O.D.R.C., personal communication, April 4,2000).  
15. Of course, what constitutes a “serious” violation is a discretionary matter and likely 
variable on the particular context in which that violation occurs. See Chayet (1997) and 
Jacobs (1982) for a discussion on factors influencing decisions to affect good time 
credits.  
16. Although the court did not address the due process issue, it is clear that the bad time 
statute did not provide the same degree of protections afforded defendants in criminal 
prosecutions. An additional concern is that discretionary tools such as parole and good 
time decisions used by prison administrators are usually out of the public’s view (Atkins 
and Pogrebin, 1987).  
17. It should be acknowledged that several policy makers challenged the characterization of 
Senate Bill 2 as tough on crime, presumably because of its additional support of 
community based sanctions and its punitive focus on violent, repeat, and serious drug 
offenders rather than crime in general (see “Truth in sentencing: Major rewrite of criminal 
law still debated”, 1996). However, a review of the legislation in general and statutes 
dealing with restricting “lenient” correctional discretion clearly indicates that the new 
criminal code had a considerable punitive component. Further, such arguments belie the 
consistent theme of punitively oriented changes to Ohio criminal justice policy in Ohio 
during the past 20 years (see Holcomb, 2000).  
18. As previously noted, this article does not address whether “bad the’’ achieved its stated 
goals. In fact, one of the suggestions made here is that such stated goals may actually 
be less significant to understanding the policy than the circumstances in which they were 
proposed. The short lifespan of the policy and its relatively Sequent usage would also 
raise serious validity concerns on any impact assessment of bad time.  
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